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Liability of Carrier For Loss or Damage to
International Shipments
Thomas R. Skulina*
T HOUGH SHIPMENTS BY TRUCK or rail are usually interstate or intra-
state, many such shipments traverse the Mexican and Canadian bor-
ders or involve delivery from or to an ocean vessel for international
transshipment.
The federal laws which set out the liability of a carrier for interstate
shipments are known as the Carmack Amendment and the Cummins
Acts.' This article will deal with the regulation of the so-called "Inter-
national Shipment."
A myriad of problems arises in the determination of what law is
applicable to a shipment that either originated in or is destined for a
foreign nation. Though the Federal statute itself is relatively simple,
2
the case law has left some unanswered questions.
The original Carmack Amendment of 1906 pertained solely to
property in transportation from a point in one state to a point in an-
other state or, in other words, to interstate shipments. There was no
provision directly relating to transportation involving a foreign country.
In 1915, the original Carmack Amendment was amended by the first
Cummins Act so as to expand to include shipments from any point in the
United States to any point in an adjacent foreign country. The present
law has left this portion of the first Cummins Amendment unchanged.8
It is apparent that there is a limit to the patterns of movement a
shipment can make when it involves movement in some part in the
United States.
These may be characterized as:
*Assistant General Attorney, Penn Central Co., Inc., Cleveland, Ohio.
1 49 U.S.C. § 20(11). Skulina, Liability of a Carrier for Loss and Damage to Inter-
state Shipments, 17 Clev. Mar. L. R. 251 (1968); reprinted 14 The Chronicle 2-23
(1968); and in Freight Transportation-Legal, Regulatory & Economic Aspects (Prac-
ticing Law Institute, Commercial Law and Practice No. 21, 1969), pp. 73-94. See also,
Skulina, Law Regarding Liability of a Carrier For Loss Or Damage to Interstate
Shipments, Freight Transportation, id. at 57-71; Lust, Loss and Damage Claims (2d
Ed. 1919); Oleck, Cases on Damages, 60, 63 (1962); note, Liability of the Common
Carrier for Loss or Damage to Goods in Ohio, 10 West. Res. L. R. 276 (1959).
2 Ibid.: "Any common carrier ... subject to the provisions of this chapter receiving
property for transportation from a point in one State or Territory or the District of
Columbia to a point in another State, Territory, District of Columbia, or from any
point in the United States to a point in an adjacent foreign country shall issue a re-
ceipt or bill of lading therefor . . . for any loss, damage, or injury to such property
caused by it or by any common carrier .... to which such property may be delivered
or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United States or with-
in an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill of lading...."
3 Id.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1970
LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL SHIPMENTS
(1) a totally intrastate movement;
(2) an interstate movement not involving a foreign nation;
(3) shipment to an adjacent foreign country from the United States;
(4) shipment from an adjacent foreign country to the United States;
(5) shipment to a non-adjacent foreign country from the United
States;
(6) shipment from a non-adjacent foreign country to the United
States;
(7) shipments in bond regardless of origin or destination that in-
volve movement in the United States.
4
From this it would appear that it would be a simple matter to as-
certain the origin and destination of a given shipment and then apply
the appropriate provision of the Carmack Amendment, as amended. It
will be seen, however, that the determination of the proper classification
of a movement is not so simple and has led to a split of opinion in the
United States Supreme Court.
Interstate and Intrastate Movements
The rules pertaining to intrastate and interstate movements are well
settled once the evidence of the case justifies identifying the movement
as solely within one state or that between two or more states. The legal
effect of this distinction is that latter type of movement is subject to
federal rather than state law.
The primary modification of common law afforded by the Carmack
Amendment is that a prima facie case of negligence is established when
it is proven that the shipment was received at the point of origin in good
condition and was received in a damaged state at the point of destination.
Though many carriers might have been involved in the movement, the
plaintiff by reason of the Statute can sue either the initial or the deliver-
ing carrier. The shipper does not have to concern himself with the fact
that the negligent act might have been performed by an intermediate
carrier.
Under state laws, however, the carrier is liable only for its own
negligence and, therefore, it is necessary to prove a particular carrier
received a shipment in good condition and delivered it in damaged
condition.5
4 See Louisiana Southern Ry. Co. v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 191 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.
1951) and, 187 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1951). A shipment might also be considered a
switching movement. This category of a movement is a further delineation of an
intrastate move and also goes to the question whether a particular carrier qualifies
as a delivering carrier as contemplated by the Carmack Amendment.
5 Ibid.
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International Movements
With respect to the remainder of categories of movement enumerated
earlier, that is, outside of interstate and intrastate movements, it is diffi-
cult to state a general rule.
6
It would appear that the simplest situation is where a shipment is
made from a point in the United States to a point in an adjacent foreign
country. Justice Frankfurter considered this problem in the case of
Mexican Light & Power Co. v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co.7 which involved
a shipment from Sharon, Pennsylvania to a point in Mexico. The dam-
age occurred on a Mexican railroad. Suit was brought against the Texas
Mexican Railroad, which was the last carrier in the United States to
handle the shipment. (The movement from Pennsylvania to Laredo,
Texas, the point where the defendant received the shipment, involved
the use of a series of carriers.)
The shipper sued the Texas railroad as it had issued a second and
new bill of lading at its yards. It had then processed the goods through
customs and delivery to the last carrier, namely, the National Railways
of Mexico, upon whose lines the damage was incurred.
Justice Frankfurter, in the majority opinion, reasoned that the Car-
mack Amendment sought a unity of responsibility. Under this Act, as
amended, the bill of lading determines the rights of the consignee. Under
the law the initial carrier is liable for damage done on the lines of con-
necting carriers.
Thus the Carmack Amendment was held to be applicable here even
though a second bill of lading had been issued. No matter what con-
venience the consignee obtained, the Court decided that unless the con-
necting carrier issuing the second bill of lading receives consideration
in addition to its proportion of the through rate, the second bill of lading
is of no weight.
Chief Justice Vinson dissented and was joined by Justice Reed.
They argued that the second bill of lading helped to clear customs and
thereby constituted consideration. They felt that the record showed that
this form of expedition would promote the export business of the Texas
Mexican Railway.
Hence, under the majority opinion, the recourse of the shipper was
to bring his action against the initial carrier who accepted the shipment
in Pennsylvania rather than a connecting carrier, which the Texas rail-
road was determined to be under the facts. The original bill of lading
established the initial carrier under the Act and the second one was not
6 Miller, Law of Freight Loss and Damage Claims 87 (2d ed. 1961). Miller attempts
to state a general rule, namely: "Generally the Carmack Amendment and the liabil-
ity it imposes upon common carriers have no application to foreign shipments, that
is, shipments originating at or destined for points outside the United States." He
qualifies this rule by: "This is subject to a certain amount of qualification, however."
7 331 U.S. 731, 67 S. Ct. 1440 (1947).
Jan. 1970
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to be considered. This is important as both the majority and the dissent
agree that the bill of lading determines the type of movement. The dis-
agreement among the members of the Court in the Mexican Light and
Power Co. case was over the issue whether in fact the chain of com-
merce had been broken upon the issuance of the subsequent bill of lad-
ing thereby making its issuer an initial carrier rather than a mere con-
necting carrier.8 There was apparently a unanimity of opinion that the
language of the Act with respect to its application to shipments from
this country to an adjacent country controlled, once a shipment is clearly
characterized as a through shipment moving in the aforementioned
fashion.
Hence, it is clear that where a carrier issues a through bill of lading
for goods that will travel from the United States to either Mexico or
Canada, its liability as an initial carrier under the Carmack Amendment
continues even though the damage occurs in either Mexico or Canada,
and it should also be pointed out that a through bill of lading will keep
a shipment interstate even though a subsequent bill without consider-
ation is issued.9
The next question then is whether the Carmack Amendment applies
to a shipment that arrives in this country from one of the adjacent
countries.
Earlier cases take the position that the Carmack Amendment does
not apply to damage that occurs while the lading is being shipped from
a point in Canada or Mexico to a point in the United States on a through
bill of lading. 10 The United States Supreme Court, however, has not
ruled on this precise point."
There is, however, an earlier United States Supreme Court decision
which raises an approach to these cases that casts some doubt on the
status of the law.
This case, namely, Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v.
8 Id. Both the majority and dissenters did disagree over the application of Missouri,
Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Ward, 244 U.S. 383, 37 S. Ct. 617 (1917). This case involved
a subsequent bill of lading issued on a solely interstate movement and the dissent
felt that it was not applicable. Justice Frankfurter relied upon it and held that the
Mexican Power Light Co. case was even stronger for the principle of no consider-
ation since in the Ward case it was at least alleged that a special rate approved by
the Interstate Commerce Commission would govern the second bill of lading, how-
ever, no proof had been entered that it affected the through rate on the original bill
of lading.
9 Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Ward, supra n. 8.
10 Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1949); Alwine v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
141 Pa. Super. 558, 15 A.2d 507 (1940).
11 In Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113, 70 S. Ct. 499 (1949); rehear, den. 339 U.S.
936, 70 S. Ct. 663 (1949), the majority opinion distinguished the Alwine case (n. 86)
from the case before it, but stated that it did not need to determine in the Reider
case whether the Alwine case was correctly decided. Reider involves a separate bill
of lading at port. Alwine involves a through bill.
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Woodbury,'12 was decided by the Court shortly after the passage of the
Cummins Amendment. It is peculiar in that it involves a round trip
that started from Canada to Texas, with a stopover there, and a return
to Canada. The plaintiff was a passenger and lost her baggage on the
return leg of her trip. She had made no declaration of value and the
carrier contended that under federal law she was bound by the limitation
in the tariff. The plaintiff argued that because of the type of move she
made, from an adjacent foreign country and returning to the same coun-
try, it was not covered by the Carmack Amendment. She contended fur-
ther that Texas law should apply. Under this law no declaration of value
was necessary, a carrier was forbidden to limit his liability for baggage
loss and the tariff requirements as to stated value were void.
The Court ruled that the federal law applied. Reference was made
to § 1 of the Transportation Act,13 which is the underlying declaration
of the entire Act of which the Carmack Amendment is a part. This de-
cision demonstrates that the various provisions of the Act should be read
together to achieve an overall purpose of a uniform policy of transporta-
tion. Since § 1 provides that the Interstate Commerce Act applies to all
shipments whether to or from any foreign country insofar as the trans-
portation takes place in the United States, the Court held that the test
to be applied is not the direction of the movement, but the field of the
carrier's operation. Hence, since the transportation was subject to regu-
lation, both parties were subject to the published tariffs. Since the car-
rier was permitted by the Cummins Amendment to limit its liability and
had done so in the tariff, the Court ruled against the plaintiff.
This case does not offer a blanket rule that the Carmack Amend-
ment applies to shipments that originate in an adjacent foreign country,
but rather that the movement of commerce within the United States
under the aforementioned circumstances is regulated by the Interstate
Commerce Act and, therefore, carrier and shipper alike must adhere to
the lawfully published tariffs and the bill of lading which was issued in
accordance with the tariffs.
The Woodbury case leaves an area of confusion when viewed in
light of later Supreme Court decisions. This conflict comes over its ulti-
mate reference to the Cummins Amendment which permitted the limita-
tion. Actually, as it will be shown, the liability stems from the contract
of carriage. Since the movement was regulated at the time damage was
sustained the fact that the bill of lading was in accord with the author-
ized tariff would be basis enough to settle the differences between the
12 254 U.S. 357, 41 S. Ct. 114 (1920).
13 49 U.S.C. § 1(1) Carriers subject to regulation . . . (b) "... From one State ...
to any other state . . . or from any place in the United States through a foreign
country to any other place in the United States, or from or to any place in the
United States to or from a foreign country, but only insofar as such transportation
or transmission takes place within the United States."
Jan. 1970
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parties and there was no need to stretch the thin membrane of the Car-
mack Amendment to cover the situation.
It appears, however, that where a shipment originates in another
country and a domestic bill of lading is issued in this country, the Car-
mack Amendment applies. 14 If, on the other hand, only one "straight"
bill of lading is issued in the country of origin the Carmack Amendment
would not apply.15
The next situation to be considered is the shipment which originated
in this country for ultimate destination to a non-adjacent foreign
country.
Prior to discussing that case it should be noted that before it was
decided a Fourth Circuit United States Court of Appeals case took the
same approach as did the Supreme Court in the Woodbury case. 16 That
case occurred at the time when the railroads were being run by the
government. A shipment of coal bound for export to a non-adjacent
foreign country was appropriated by the government for the railroad's
use. It was held that the limitations of value in the bill of lading did
not apply since the Carmack Amendment does not pertain to exports to
non-adjacent countries. Actually, the shipper could have recovered un-
der the rule that limitations of value in a bill of lading do not apply
where the carrier converts the goods to its own use, but the court chose
to talk in terms of the Cummins Amendment rather than referring to
the contract of carriage and the common law rule that eliminates limita-
tions of liability under these circumstances.
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Porter,7 the carrier issued an
export bill of lading in two parts, namely, one part for the inland route
from Earle, Arkansas to Brunswick, Georgia and the second part for the
ocean voyage to Liverpool, England. The bill contained an exemption
of liability for fire occurring in Brunswick. A fire not caused by the
carrier damaged the cotton lading. Under Arkansas law such a limita-
tion of liability would be invalid.
The Court held categorically that the Carmack and Cummins
Amendments did not apply to shipments on a through bill of lading
originating with interstate rail transportation and continuing on ocean
transportation to a non-adjacent foreign country. The Court referred to
§ 1(6)18 of the Act which relates to the general regulation of issuance,
form and substance of bills of lading. The Court held that provision of
the Act is broad enough to give validity to the provision exempting the
14 Yeckes-Eichenbaum v. The Texas Mexican Railway Co., 165 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.
Texas 1957).
15 Condakes v. Smith, 281 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1968).
16 Dexter & Carpenter v. Davies, 281 F. 385 (4th Cir. 1922).
17 273 U.S. 341, 47 S. Ct. 383 (1927).
18 49 U.S.C. § 1(6).
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carriers in this instance. Since Congress had entered the field of regu-
lation the state law has no application. Thus, the effect of the Carmack
Amendment was felt even though technically it did not apply. Interest-
ingly enough, despite this decision of applicable regulatory law, no act
of Congress or of the Interstate Commerce Commission had prescribed
a bill of lading for this kind of move. 19
To this point all the various types of movements have been dis-
cussed except the situation of an import from a non-adjacent foreign
country and the specialized situation of a shipment in bond.20 The law
is clear that once a shipment is designated as being in bond while it is
in this country, and where subsequently there is no delivery or change
of title but merely a series of different carriers assisting in a continuous
transportation from one country to another, the federal regulatory acts
discussed in this paper do not apply.21 This is true even if the property
came from an adjacent foreign country for transferral to a point in an
adjacent foreign nation. 22
With respect to imports from non-adjacent countries, the United
States Supreme Court was faced with the problem in the case of Reider
v. Thompson.23 This case arose upon appeal from a district court's dis-
missal of an action on the grounds that the Carmack Amendment did not
apply. The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals24 affirmed the
trial court and the United States Supreme Court reversed with Justice
Frankfurter dissenting.
The facts of the case were that a shipment of skins and wool had
been shipped from Buenos Aires, Argentina to Boston, Massachusetts by
way of the port of New Orleans, Louisiana. The holder of the bill of
lading sued the railroad which received the goods at New Orleans. He
claimed the essentials of a prima facie case under the Carmack Amend-
ment, namely, the goods were in good condition when received in New
Orleans and were found damaged on arrival in Boston.
The ocean bill of lading indicated the Port of Discharge as New
Orleans and also showed that the lading was shipped to the order of The
First National Bank of Boston. Notice of arrival was to be addressed to
Rudolph Reider, the plaintiff, at Boston, Massachusetts, if the goods
were consigned to "Shipper's Order." The domestic bill of lading issued
by the railroad at New Orleans recited that the goods were received
19 In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 64 I.C.C. 347.
20 See 19 U.S.C. § 1551, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to designate
a carrier that has made application to be a carrier of bonded merchandise. See also
19 U.S.C. §§ 1552, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
21 United States v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 188 F. 484 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1911).
22 Canales v. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co., 37 I.C.C. 573 (1916).
23 Supra n. 12.
24 176 F. 2d 13 (5th Cir. 1948).
Jan. 1970
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from H. P. Lambert & Co. and consigned to same at Boston. The Fifth
Circuit considered this movement as one made under a through bill of
lading, or, in other words, a "through foreign shipment." 25 The Appel-
late Court then applied the doctrine of Missouri Pacific Rd. Co. v. Por-
ter,26 which was discussed earlier.
The Supreme Court majority held that the characterization of the
shipment as foreign or domestic was made to determine liability. The
Court held that the bill of lading was not a through bill from Buenos
Aires to Boston. The contract for ocean carriage terminated at New
Orleans and the subsequent bill of lading was not a "supplement," but
a new bill of lading. It was pointed out that: "The test is not where the
shipment originated, but where the obligation of the carrier or receiving
carrier originated." 27
The Court stated that the carrier here is not held responsible for
the negligence of the ship, if any, since it was necessary for the plaintiff
to prove as a part of his prima facie case that the goods were in good
condition when received by the railroad. The Court reiterated that:
"The purpose of the Carmack Amendment was to relieve shippers of the
burden of searching out a particular negligent carrier from among the
often numerous carriers handling an interstate shipment of goods." 28
Justice Frankfurter dissented and relied on the Porter case. He
argued that the Court had considered the regulatory scheme of the
Interstate Commerce Act in its entirety and arrived at the conclusion
that the Carmack Amendment does not apply to an unbroken trans-
action of commerce with a non-adjacent foreign country. He opposed
taking the Carmack Amendment out of context of the regulatory scheme
and remarked that: "A legal faggot ought not to be broken into verbal
sticks." 29
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has in effect amended the Carmack Amendment
once any justification lies for positing the obligation of a carrier as be-
ginning in this country. There is left, therefore, the problem of guessing
which shipments may be considered by the Court as through shipments
as opposed to those movements of commerce which the Court decides
to view as segments rather than a single movement.
It is true that the contract of carriage, namely, the bill of lading,
should determine the liability of the parties. This bill, as long as it co-
25 Id.
26 Supra n. 17.
27 Reider v. Thompson, supra n. 11.
28 Id., 119.
29 Id.
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incides with the authorized published tariff, should, in accordance with
the Interstate Commerce Act, govern the issue or damage where an
interstate movement is made, or where a foreign country is involved.
The bill of lading actually will incorporate most of the Carmack Amend-
ment among its provisions.
That is not to say that the Carmack Amendment should be utilized
in every instance. Congress indicated its clear intention to limit the
application of this provision. Without a change in the Act itself, a ship-
ment from a foreign country destined for a point in the United States
should invoke the Carmack Amendment only when a domestic bill of
lading is issued.
Whether the Carmack Amendment applies should concern even
parties who have a bill of lading that in effect reiterates the Amendment
for a serious question of jurisdiction might arise if the grounds for juris-
diction in a federal court is that the action is governed by a federal
statute.
The lawyer, therefore, who represents either a carrier or a shipper
in a matter involving loss or damage to an international shipment, must
carefully review the shipping documents and satisfy himself as to the
character of the move and the applicability of federal law. 0
30 One type of movement not discussed is that involving prison-made goods. See 49
U.S.C. § 60.
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